\u2013 In the first days of the full-scale invasion, I joined the units from which the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade was later formed. At the time, it was Azov Kyiv Territorial Defence, which was later transformed into an Azov Special Operations Forces detachment and then into the Third Assault Brigade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At first, I was a driver-medic and evacuated the wounded from the front line. Later, I fought as an assault trooper and an assault group commander. I took part in battles near Bakhmut, in Avdiivka and then on the Kharkiv axis, among other places.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Around May 2024, on the battalion commander’s order, I switched from assault work to developing ground robotic systems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Until summer 2025, we developed the logistics and evacuation line and shared this experience with the entire brigade. Then we moved on to purely strike missions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We started with two large-scale operations. In the first, we held a position for 45 days with a single robot armed with a machine gun.<\/a> In the second, we carried out a full-fledged robotic assault, captured enemy troops using UGVs<\/a> and liberated territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These operations led us to scale up from a UGV platoon in an assault battalion to a separate strike UGV unit within the Third Assault Brigade. This happened on the order of Brigadier General Andriy Biletsky, who is genuinely very interested in the subject of UGVs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 9 months of work, NC13 has conducted more than 60 assault and special operations using robots and, in addition, 103 sabotage missions in which UGVs went into the enemy’s rear. The unit says it has carried out more than 400 strikes using drones.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2013 Your statistics mention 6,000 lives saved with the help of UGVs. Are you still involved in evacuation and logistics?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2013 Our unit performs strike missions exclusively: sabotage, assault and defensive operations. Meanwhile, the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade has a unit called NOVA, which handles logistics and evacuation across the whole brigade and helps the corps with this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 6,000 lives saved means 6,000 people whom we replaced while carrying out strike missions. That is, to destroy a dugout and eliminate the infantry, we need to deploy up to eight people. Instead, we sent two kamikaze ground drones.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2013 How often do you carry out strike missions with UGVs, and how are they funded?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2013 Every strike mission is actually unique: it is planned and prepared separately, and we study the enemy for it. These operations require a lot of resources, but not so much money.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As for the money, we find it in different ways: in some cases the guys chip in, in others we borrow funds, find sponsors, and the brigade helps.<\/p>\n\n\n\n State support is not as large-scale as we would like. It goes mostly to logistics and evacuation UGVs, because the strike segment is not as developed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the same time, we carry out strike missions almost every day. We systematically destroy enemy dugouts and shelters using ground kamikaze drones that carry 30-50 kg of explosives each.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We are given a certain number of targets per week, and we hit them \u2013 this is already routine, as is the use of UGVs with machine guns and grenade launchers. We send such drones to specific sectors where the enemy is active. They support the infantry in positional defence or in offensive actions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2013 What role did UGVs play during Vivaldi?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2013 UGVs became one of the key factors in the success of the Vivaldi offensive operation, planned by Brigadier General Andriy Biletsky. In the initial stage, ground drones distracted the enemy and forced it to reveal its surveillance and fire assets, drawing all focus onto itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While the enemy was hunting the robots, assault groups entered its battle formations unimpeded.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Afterwards, kamikaze UGVs and drones with combat modules kept up constant fire on command posts, UAV operator positions and areas where personnel were concentrated. This disrupted Russian logistics, disorganised command and control and undermined the enemy’s morale. Prisoners even said that the appearance of UGVs on the battlefield forced them to abandon their positions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Thanks to striking UGVs in Vivaldi, <\/em>about 2,500 lives were saved. The robotic systems carried out more than 200 strikes and performed 94 assault and sabotage operations without risk to Ukrainian troops.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n The targets hit included shelters, fortified defensive structures, depots, command posts, enemy UAV accumulation and launch points, and enemy command personnel.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\u0421\u0442\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0438\u043a\u0430](\"https:\/\/thedefender.media\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/zrobyly-nemozhlyve-6000-vryatovanyh-zhyttiv-ta-ponad-400-urazhen-za-dopomogoyu-nrk.za-kozhnoyu-iz-czyh-819x1024.webp\")
Scale of UGV use<\/h4>\n\n\n\n